Despite much talk of coordinating technology and industrial policies toward China
Posted: Mon Jan 20, 2025 5:45 am
Many developing countries are prioritizing economic and technological development and already have a strong Chinese presence in their digital infrastructure and technology cooperation. This is influencing their choices regarding the future of the Internet and the participation of Chinese players. For example, Indonesia and Malaysia recently signed deals with Beijing on cybersecurity and capacity building, and are pursuing smart city projects with Chinese firms such as Huawei . Other major developing countries, such as Brazil and South Africa, are allowing Chinese firms to participate in next-generation telecommunications networks.
This means that even if countries within a politically “trusted community” commit to cleansing their digital networks of Chinese technology, they can still count on its presence in large swaths of the world. For example, foreign transportation markets could still be filled with vehicles made in China and driven by AI platforms developed by vietnam telegram number database Chinese firms, using network standards developed jointly with Chinese participants, and telecommunications infrastructure built by Chinese firms. And within such a trusted community, the cost of developing “China-free” technology ecosystems would increase significantly due to diminishing returns to scale.
Moreover, technologically advanced liberal democracies disagree about the extent and type of government control that should be exercised over the Internet. The divergence between the U.S. and the EU over the regulation of data storage and transmission, platform businesses, and other online activity appears to be widening, despite ongoing efforts to reconcile these differences. Leading technology firms from countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea continue to invest in China and work with Chinese partners.
there appears to be little appetite in most countries for extensive “decoupling.” And governments have yet to commit sufficient resources to replace the opportunities offered by China’s emerging Internet of Things ecosystem. At the same time, competition is growing among advanced economies to dominate future technologies and markets. This can be seen in the growing barrage of EU policies aimed at achieving “digital sovereignty” at the expense of U.S. business interests.
This means that even if countries within a politically “trusted community” commit to cleansing their digital networks of Chinese technology, they can still count on its presence in large swaths of the world. For example, foreign transportation markets could still be filled with vehicles made in China and driven by AI platforms developed by vietnam telegram number database Chinese firms, using network standards developed jointly with Chinese participants, and telecommunications infrastructure built by Chinese firms. And within such a trusted community, the cost of developing “China-free” technology ecosystems would increase significantly due to diminishing returns to scale.
Moreover, technologically advanced liberal democracies disagree about the extent and type of government control that should be exercised over the Internet. The divergence between the U.S. and the EU over the regulation of data storage and transmission, platform businesses, and other online activity appears to be widening, despite ongoing efforts to reconcile these differences. Leading technology firms from countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea continue to invest in China and work with Chinese partners.
there appears to be little appetite in most countries for extensive “decoupling.” And governments have yet to commit sufficient resources to replace the opportunities offered by China’s emerging Internet of Things ecosystem. At the same time, competition is growing among advanced economies to dominate future technologies and markets. This can be seen in the growing barrage of EU policies aimed at achieving “digital sovereignty” at the expense of U.S. business interests.